This reply critically analyzes the concept of "solidarity" in Caroline West's account of the role that a Universal Basic Income (UBI) could play in Central Appalachian re-development. I argue that a robust structural form of "solidarity" would necessarily play an essential role in formulating a political bloc capable of implementing an ambitious project like a UBI. In addition to this implicit role of a structural form of solidarity that can connect various communities and constituencies together into a powerful political bloc, Caroline West also articulates an important role for highly local forms of community and solidarity in this region's transformation. Given the two distinct ways that "solidarity" functions in her account, I raise questions about how the formal features of a UBI relate to both its local and more structural forms.
future, we might add to this list the competitive pressure exerted by alternative power sources that have made employment dependent on coal extraction particularly precarious. West's analysis of the recent history of Central Appalachia thus offers an early case study of the local impacts of energy transition that we might fruitfully relate to some other fossil fuel-dependent regions where we can anticipate similar transitions in the relatively near future.
West observes that, as early as the 1960s, political rhetoric and actual policy constructed poverty in Appalachia as a problem to be solved from the outside, rather than a set of local issues to be addressed through the agency of those who live there. By West's account, the shortcomings of policy responses have generated skepticism towards top-down solutions. Since the publication of "From Company Town to Post-Industrial: Inquiry on the Redistribution of Space and Capital with a Universal Basic Income, " Phillip Lewin has built on earlier research by Rebecca Scott, Shannon Elizabeth Bell, Richard York, and others, substantiating the claim that the hegemonic cultural politics of coal in the region are supported, in part, by a sense that the federal government is a neglectful or even actively hostile force representing urban sensibilities that devalue and marginalize the region's residents. Understandably, then, West attributes importance to identifying opportunities for "bottom-up" responses that emphasize local agency and draw upon the strength and vibrancy of local communities when constructing a future in which coal plays a signi cantly reduced role. By critiquing the actual state of affairs in these communities from the perspective of UBI's potential, West challenges us to think clearly about how political projects in the present and near future will need to engage with the particularities of such historical legacies while nurturing the speci c forms of agency capable of taking them on.
Even so, by drawing on Marxian critical geography, West argues that the geographical relationships between cities and rural areas like Central Appalachia should be understood as "class phenomena. " Given that this calls on us to see the problems of Central Appalachia as exemplary of broader structural features of capitalism, I ask how might we understand the connections between the speci c concerns of this region and those of others who are positioned quite differently. Many fossil fuel extracting regions will engage on cultural and environmental terrains shaped by very different histories, but will face similar kinds of economic disruption in the coming years. To understand Central Appalachian social and economic conditions in terms of broader analytics of class and capitalism, rather than exclusively in terms of the region's exceptionality, particularity, singularity, or uniqueness, is to suggest that there may be meaningful ways to articulate the circumstances West observes in Central Appalachia with those found elsewhere.
But what role could West's UBI proposal play in mediating these kinds of differences?
How might we make sense of the functions West attributes to "community" and "solidarity" in this mediation? To begin speaking to these questions, I will ask whether the UBI functions in West's analysis as a speculative narrative, thought experiment, or horizon towards which a politics might be constructed-or if, instead, West is describing it as a practical political project.
Is the UBI a practical political goal or a speculative narrative about the future?
West understands the Universal Basic Income to be "universal" in the sense that it is unconditional, "basic" in the sense that it provides for "shelter, food, and clothes, " and an "income" in the sense that it uses periodic cash payments to achieve these ends. Drawing nancial resources to people could enhance capacities for self-determination and local economic control. West points, for instance, to the ways that a UBI could increase opportunities for people to pursue education, as in the example of BitSource, or facilitate the creation of small local businesses, as in the example of a local restaurant. West argues that by redistributing capital to a region that has the necessary cultural and creative resources to transition away from coal but not the means to do so, a UBI could shift power to shape the region's future away from absentee capital controlled by owners in the metropole, who have had an essentially predatory relationship to the region.
But where on the spectrum from "practical political goal" to "thought experiment" is the UBI proposal West offers? Is UBI an ambitious but relatively practical political proposal that might be added to a list of other ambitious political projects that have been taken up in recent years? Alternatively, is UBI a speculative narrative about the future that West proposes as a political horizon towards which we might orient other, more immediate projects? In the conclusion, West acknowledges some of the limitations of a UBI: "I make no claim that, in isolation, a UBI has the ability to end all poverty or create the conditions to overthrow the capitalist mode of production. " West suggests that instead, we should understand it as a way of "level[ing] the playing eld" and enabling poorer Appalachians to take a more active role in generating a more "diverse economy. " Thus, West distinguishes the ostensibly practical UBI from what is characterized as a less immediately achievable political horizon: the possibility that we might address all want or begin to "overthrow the capitalist mode of production. " Juxtaposed with a revolution that eliminates all poverty, the UBI seems like a tenable triangulation between progressive political commitments and the politics of the possible.
Though she positions the UBI as a realistic political project that triangulates between the ideal and the possible, West may downplay the scope of mobilization and transformation necessary to arrive at this goal. West suggests that solidarities are already emerging among those who seek to envision a life after coal in the region, focusing on how these social connections could generate community-based redevelopment if there was a UBI in place; however, creating a UBI will require a political bloc with wider geographical scope than the social connections that characterize families and local communities can achieve.
Rather than starting my evaluation of the UBI by asking whether or not it is a means to "create the conditions to overthrow the capitalist mode of production, " I begin by asking what it would take to implement the UBI itself. My contention is that a UBI that provides for the basic necessities would require that we have already made signi cant progress towards transforming the capitalist mode of production before we could even begin making payments. This seems especially true if we are imagining that other existing government-provided social supports would be maintained, rather than cannibalized by this proposal.
A universal income that could cover basic needs would require a signi cant enough political mobilization that economic modeling is likely less to be important to our to something like Medicare for All, but the important distinction is that the Medicare for All would be transforming already-existing transfers of wealth from everyday people to the healthcare industry to payments to the government in taxes, likely with some redistribution of the burden to those most able to pay. The scale of a UBI is not so large as to seem unthinkable, but the proposal involves an extraordinary change, to be sure.
We might imagine a UBI of this scale funded by direct taxation, with government incomes and payments in a given year somewhere close to balanced, but this would certainly require nding many new kinds of taxation, not just a progressive adjustment of marginal rates. Carbon fee-and-dividend schemes that tax emissions simply could not generate payments close to this size, much less net bene ts of this scale. We might imagine that we could fund a UBI simply by expanding the money supply, but even under very sympathetic assumptions, this would require a degree of public intervention much larger than that to which we are accustomed. In any case, a very different balance in the struggle over how the federal government represents the interests of the working and precarious classes versus private owners, nancial capital, and the like would likely be necessary to achieve these kinds of changes to taxation or monetary policy. While it might not require an entirely different "mode of production, " it very well might require a political bloc with enough power that it could re-con gure some of the essential social relations of production, circulation, and consumption, if those were the goals towards which it was oriented.
Among the most persuasively developed mechanisms for funding a UBI are proposals to make it a dividend from a consortium of state-owned enterprises, a sovereign/social wealth fund, or some combination of the two. These proposals offer a clear "on ramp" towards a full-scale UBI and could allow some degree of democratic control over a signi cant segment of the productive economy. Matt Bruenig, for instance, has done remarkable work envisioning how a national-scale social wealth fund could be implemented in the United States in order to pay a universal basic dividend. In his proposal, which he calls the American Solidarity Fund, he looks towards the relatively small dividend paid by the Alaska Permanent Fund to state residents. Alaska's payments, to be clear, are not nearly as large as what West is proposing: at $1100-$2072 per person annually, they are one-sixth to one-twelfth of being a "Basic Income. " But how much capital is necessary to produce dividends of this size? Bruenig estimates Alaska's sovereign wealth fund at 113% of the state's Gross Domestic Product, so scaling an Alaska-type scheme to national scale, he suggests, would entail having a fund of around $22.6 trillion. To get to a scale that is more like a "Basic Income, " we must begin imagining a fund measured in hundreds of trillions of US dollars.
The state might accumulate this kind of capital through all manner of different mechanisms, but a social wealth fund of this scale would generate a fundamentally different class dynamic: present day struggles of workers and the dispossessed against privately-held nancial capital would, to a signi cant degree, become struggles against the state. As the proportion of production democratically controlled by the social wealth fund grows, it would eventually cease to be rational to engage in such struggle, except under very local conditions. Which is to say, while this may only constitute "socialism" under very contemporary and capacious ways of using the word to include mixed economies, we would de nitely be looking at different social relations of production than the ones we have now. It is for these reasons that I argue that a UBI, especially of the scale suggested by West, would entail a radical political mobilization and/or presuppose a signi cant social transformation has already occurred. Even so, West has used UBI to good effect to generate a mode of critique that holds open the possibility of change and makes visible some of the structural challenges associated with energy transition. Since the UBI as a practical political project neither seems to have a political bloc capable of exerting the power necessary to make it real in the immediate future, nor a short-term mechanism through which a vast amount of socially owned wealth could be accumulated to support it, I am going to treat it now as a kind of speculative narrative about a possible future or an idealized political horizon. This reorients my response to the fundamental values that this narrative presupposes or represents. As a speculative narrative about a possible future, then, the UBI calls on us to imagine a future in which we put a signi cant proportion of the economy under democratic control. In this narrative, we imagine choosing to transfer these resources back out of democratic control and into the private economy. In West's account, this would enable us to enhance local control and autonomy, encourage economic diversi cation, and reduce control of absentee capital in communities that have been historically dominated by energy extractive industries. Appalachia would need to be grounded in the cultural traditions that proceeded industrial production, namely, the strengths of community and familial relationships that can be used as a counter-weight to class strati cation.
Despite all the challenges Appalachian residents face with a crumbling infrastructure and few economic resources, the people in former coal mining towns have been imagining life beyond coal despite the lack of progressive governmental support.
She continues, "Solidarity is being formed through social culture and identity and the labor of the community, " giving as an example a restaurant that buys locally. Based on West's reference to emigration, this kind of localism might both build social ties within the community and prevent the kind of generational fragmentation that has occurred in many rural communities due to emigration. Using interviews in a coal-mining town and a demographically similar town that is less directly dependent on coal, Shannon Elizabeth Bell has previously found that depopulation has signi cantly eroded social ties, reduced trust between neighbors, decreased the likelihood of giving or receiving mutual aid, and negatively impacted other indicators that sociologists take as representative of "social capital. " West's emphasis on the ways that a UBI could help stem the ow of people out of these coal-dependent communities is absolutely fundamental to understanding how the themes of community, solidarity, and the UBI are connected. This is important because West emphasizes the role of existing social connectivity in the transition. It seems possible that, in many communities affected by energy transitions, there are residues of preindustrial community and family formations that could be the building blocks for more robust forms of solidarity, as West does. We can also observe that there are a variety of forms of community and kinship that have developed within the context of the dominant industry that help to bind people together and are not reducible to the needs of these industries. While these modes of solidarity would be inadequate to form a political bloc capable of implementing a UBI on their own, that does not seem to be West's focus here; instead, she invites us to imagine one possible future and to think carefully about how an already implemented UBI would intersect with these forms of community and solidarity.
In accepting this invitation, I am reminded of how Raymond Williams treats the positive and negative content of "solidarity" as a concept of community. In the conclusion to his early work Culture and Society, he distinguishes between "the ladder, " "service, " and 21 "solidarity. " For Williams, "the ladder" is the familiar form of individual striving with a community. It essentially denies "social conscience" to the individual; it both "weakens the principle of common betterment" and "sweetens the poison of hierarchy. " Though the notion of "service" complicates liberal notions of individualism in the community, Williams suggests that it naturalizes the roles and functions of different individuals. Thus, while there is a certain degree of "personal unsel shness" involved with service, he argues that it exists "within a larger sel shness" that preserves the "status quo" but which remains unseen because it is "idealized as the necessary form of a civilization. " It is in contrast to this that Williams develops the notion of "solidarity" as a concept of community characterized by "mutual responsibility. " Solidarity, for Williams, is a mode of cooperation that sees "the common interest as the true self-interest" and nds "individual veri cation primarily in the community. " While Williams desired to bring these aspects of solidarity into a "fully democratic" future, he recognized the ways that solidarity has been historically constituted by a reactive relation, a recognition of shared conditions and experiences born of subordination within the class structure, but also often conditioned by contrasts between what is held in common and an image of an "outsider" or enemy who may not actually be identical with the ruling or owning class. Williams views the negative content of the concept of "solidarity" as something that must be overcome on the path to "a fully democratic society. " There is, on this basis, a great ambiguity in communitarian appeals to tradition: the dynamic that binds a community together often has a negative content that involves resistance to outsiders. This negative content may prove to be a barrier to articulating local struggles across space or particular conditions together. But, the "fully democratic" speculative future that Williams narrates has appeal, since it calls on us to imagine a promiscuous solidarity that transcends different particular conditions and simple modes of identi cation towards a more capacious "mutual responsibility. " When West cautiously praises solidarity among those seeking to imagine futures for their communities as the era of coal comes to an end, we can see how they might be motivated by a sense of identity, shared conditions, and common sensibilities drawn from similarities of experience and geographical proximity. But Williams's insights might caution us to be wary of a potentially dangerous countercurrent often found in this kind of communitarian social tie. A sense of regional class consciousness, which in West's account is attributed to the historical role of urban capital in the region and partially justi es imagining a "bottomup" transition, could under some conditions also encourage reactionary cultural insularity or even foster social exclusion. As we think about the structural similarities between Central Appalachia and other communities facing energy transitions, the question about how we might build bridges between narrower forms of local community solidarity will be crucial, if we aim towards what Williams describes as a more "fully democratic" community. While a sense of regionalist "bottom up" redevelopment doubtlessly will play a role in many of these transitions, regional or local solidarities may, on one hand, bind people together with mutual concern on the basis of what they have in common, while on the other hand, dividing them from those perceived as outsiders or blocking the articulation of shared interests between social groups who are situated quite differently, but facing structurally similar problems. When Bruenig describes his vision of a national-scale sovereign wealth fund paying out a universal basic income as the "American Solidarity Fund, " we can see how the concept of "mutual responsibility" functions as the governing principle that connects different places and groups. Likewise, in West's account, the UBI is the structural element that passes beyond the particular experiences of labor and precarity in a given community and addresses not just these speci cities, but the broader political economic structures and tendencies highlighted by her theoretical framework. Indeed, the UBI offers an image of solidarity that includes not just workers, but also people with disabilities and the retired. In this sense, it may indeed foster a sense of solidarity that transcends immediate social ties towards a broader sense of a shared social project that extends beyond the region and beyond the particularities of a given circumstance. Arguably, it matches the alreadyexisting social basis of production in advanced economies with a social basis for consumption, even if the proposal does not inherently necessitate putting the social basis of production under social control. The social basis for consumption it offers is considerably more universal than conservative appeals to "trickle down effects, " the developmentalist focus on "rising standards of living, " and liberal means-tested welfare programs.
Even so, it strikes me as consequential that the kind of connection it offers is mediated through the market: what we share, in this narrative, is the freedom to privately choose at an individual or family-unit level from a selection of goods and commodities. In this speculative future, the universal project will be experienced in the moment of purchase. I praise West, Bruenig, and others for taking seriously the need to imagine a common cause towards which we might orient heterogenous con icts and the needs of many communities, but I wonder what other narratives of similar ambition we leave behind if we center our attention on this story?
By preserving the structure that mediates basic survival through the mechanism of market exchange of commodities for dollars, UBI might be anticipated to underscore or even deepen the hegemonic common sense that market exchange is a natural extension of human nature-and associated ideas about what it means to be a social subject. This common sense is where "solidarity" is no longer strictly continuous with a community and something like it appears predominantly in smaller and more private social spheres: when necessity is mediated through the market, the community's reproduction through time depends upon exchange between atomized individuals. Many participate in forms of limited community, as in the forms of sociality found among extended families, some neighbors, and some church groups. These relationships are often more characterized by care than by market relationships. But, even within a community, the proportion of relationships minimally mediated by market exchange tends to be few. Under such an arrangement, mutual responsibility to others often extends not much further than these small private spheres without an inducement to do so; indeed, the market itself may be an inducement not to do so. All of this remains speculative, though: the experiences of want, necessity, and community might emerge in new constellations in a community re gured by a UBI. These are details in the narrative that remain to be written. I want to be clear that when we are talking at the level of envisioning possible futures, something like a UBI clearly looks superior to our current arrangements and could, I think, at least temporarily address the very serious economic precarity experienced by many in Central Appalachia and regions like it. I would also say that, if there was a political bloc capable of implementing it, UBI might offer something like a bridge, both for energy transition and towards addressing fundamental questions about how to deal with automation, how we might fairly compensate unpaid and underpaid gendered and raced labor, how to include people with disabilities and the elderly, and more. But, as we work to construct these bridges in the present, I would argue for the importance of taking stock of the alternative narratives of similar ambition and what they might mean for building and sustaining the alliances necessary to achieve lasting change.
Conclusion: Alternative speculative futures
The kinds of sociality and subjectivity associated with a society organized around UBI might be qualitatively different than those associated with other institutions of similar ambition. As a speculative narrative about the future, it offers a relatively laudable vision:
in the future, we could extend participation in the market to those who have previously been excluded. The need to orient ourselves towards a future in which we are able to address the ongoing energy transition is quite clear: the many ways that this transition calls on us to work together across many communities to re gure our cultural, sociotechnical, and political economic arrangements are, perhaps, the de ning challenges of our time. Central Appalachia gives us a case study where energy transition-at least in terms of production-is already underway, but in the coming years, the energy transition will need to extend both to the rural areas that have been directly dependent on fossil fuel extraction and, quite possibly, to the urban ones where the fabric of everyday life has been predicated on the promise of ongoing access to cheap fossil fuel energy. envision the kind of community that could be cultivated by socialized kitchens or grocers.
Since the UBI involves dreaming big, are there alternative ways to deepen solidarity and address food insecurity that could help connect people across space, situation, and preference? What would they look like? I would pose the decommodi cation of food as a possible substitute vision. Since both alternatives are distant from material realization and are operating at the level of narratives about possible futures, which is the one we would prefer to work towards?
It seems plausible to think a UBI would help people in Central Appalachians access adequate housing on the private market. This is a genuinely praiseworthy goal. It could even help inject the kind of liquid capital necessary to renovate existing sub-standard housing. But is there an alternative pathway oriented towards the decommodi cation of shelter, perhaps in the form of high quality publicly owned housing? How might the community implied by this alternative pathway differ?
I would return to Daniel Zamora's critique of the UBI, wherein he answers the question "Isn't the best way to ght capitalism to limit the sphere in which it operates?" by reminding us that capitalism has made market exchange the nearly exclusive means to acquire goods necessary for our reproduction. In doing so, it turned money into almost the only valid medium of exchange and it made the majority of the population dependent on capital, enforcing a fundamentally asymmetric power relation between the boss and the worker. This profoundly unequal relationship not only subordinates people within the sphere of labor, but outside it as well, through the powerful in uence economic power exerts on politics, ideology, and culture. This is not to say that decommodi cation of necessities is somehow an easier goal to achieve than the UBI; it may in fact be harder. But given the scale of the social transformation envisioned by a UBI, we should think carefully about which parts of social reproduction we want inside the market and which ones we do not. I am sensitive to the way that, at their best, conversations concerning the UBI draw on the incisive analysis of Marxist feminisms, "wages for housework" activism, and studies of disability and aging.
Much of the care work necessary to social reproduction has been historically set outside of the market, with the effect of cheapening it and appropriating it. But what these struggles have made clear is that we are constantly renegotiating the boundaries between the formal economic sphere and those parts of the web of life in which it is embedded and on which it depends. The UBI offers one vision that takes this seriously and seeks to offer a more humane world in response. But an alternative narrative that could be just as a humane might seek to constrain, rather than expand, the role of the market in mediating social reproduction. 3. Like many other explorations of Universal Basic Income, this suggests that we take seriously the challenge posed by automation. But where questions concerning automation often take on a relatively abstract form and address possible future waves of automation, West implicitly suggests that the history of automation and employment in the coal industry gives us a historical case study relevant to this strand in UBI conversations. In Central Appalachia, the conditions that UBI proponents often suggest will make a UBI necessary may already exist. Of course, these arguments have been in circulation for some time, at least since André Gorz suggested UBI as an alternative to the then-dominant models of social citizenship in the France. Calls for a UBI have had to contend with the fact that, despite increasingly sophisticated and widespread automation for several decades, there is still relatively high employment. Arguments for basic incomes often suggest that the potential productivity gains of automation are masked by the creation of a panoply of "bullshit jobs" that have little social necessity. This tends to preserve the existing social order, rather than reshaping our lives around increased leisure time or encouraging us to acknowledge the importance of socially bene cial work that occurs outside of formal economic exchange. If these arguments hold water, the relative lack of economic diversity in coal dependent regions might illuminate something quite important in relation to UBI proposals: in these regions, rather than a rise in "bullshit jobs" we have seen signi cant numbers of unemployed people, people whose primary labor is uncompensated domestic labor, partially employed shapes the political horizon. The Alaska Permanent Fund involves taking a percentage from the total production of oil and placing it into a diversi ed pool of investments. Like Alaska, Central Appalachia has long seen energy extractive industries as ways to provide for social welfare. This provides a much more material reason that residents may resist or resent energy transition than accounts of the cultural politics of coal operating only at the level of identity and ideology allow. For instance, in the portions of Central Appalachia located in West Virginia, locallyprovided social services (such as education, town and county roads, and local water systems) receive signi cant revenues from the Coal Severance Tax, the Coalbed Methane Gas Severance Tax, and the Oil and Gas Severance Tax. In the Alaskan case, a portion of fossil fuel revenue is paid into a fund, which then pays a dividend to those who live in the state. While energy transition in the two regions is happening on very different timelines, we may observe that without a clear plan, energy transition threatens not only jobs in these communities, but also many of the social services and public goods that bind them together. Alaskans might reasonably anticipate that they will see continued pro table oil extraction for many years to come. In contrast, by many accounts, Central Appalachian coal is only economically recoverable today due to the presence of extensive already-operating xed capital that makes it a competitive source for metallurgical coal and source for thermal coal at facilities that cannot be readily converted to cheaper fuels like natural gas; some recent accounts suggest that other energy producing technologies may have already become cheaper to install than the existing coal-based infrastructure is to operate, which would indicate that it is only a matter of time before the energy transition in this region accelerates. This is not to say that coal production is going to disappear overnight, but the time horizon across which we might imagine coal to be able to contribute indirectly to the social good is relatively short. Like Bruenig, West suggests we think of UBI at the national scale. In the context of this comparison, this is sensible: the accelerating transition to other energy sources makes vivid the need to transfer capital to such communities. Bruenig, "Social Wealth Fund for America. " 20. If we looking for material and pragmatic projects to facilitate a "just transition" in Appalachia, we might focus instead on strengthening existing institutions and providing targeted investment in new capacities, which could help to cultivate a sense of participating in a shared social project: expansion of publicly funded healthcare, post-secondary education and training, childcare, food programs (like
USDA The Emergency Food Access Program and Commodity Supplemental Food
Program), and housing assistance would be immensely helpful. Somewhat more ambitiously, but well keyed to the needs that West identi es, we might invest heavily in green public works programs, perhaps not unlike the RECLAIM Act that West mentions or something more like a Green Tennessee Valley Authority-or, we might, incentivize new regional industries with targeted "Big Green Buys. " These proposals may lack the ambition of a UBI, but might be seen as small steps in the right direction. Matt Bruenig, "Fight Climate Change with a Green Tennessee Valley
